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…reform is a journey rather than a destination.” 
Governance in Transition 
OECD, 1995 
 
But perhaps the most important lesson from the experience of the 
past two decades is that reform is continuous. As societies keep 
changing, governments must keep adapting. 
Public Sector Modernisation: The Way Forward 
OECD Policy Brief, November 2005 
 
And so these parties divided upon the midnight plain, each 
passing back the way the other had come, pursuing as all 
travelers must inversions without end upon other men’s 
journeys. 




Public sector reform is as old as the innovations of Hammurabi and the Mongols, 
indeed as old as the state and its administrative machinery. These reform efforts were 
typically driven by internal pressures or limited borrowings from regional rivals. 
Catherine the Great’s attempts at administrative reforms in the 18th century were inspired 
by European and particularly French models. The emergence of a “global” mode of 
reform – in which reforms were modeled (or imposed) on systems from other 
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January 19-20, 2007. Please do not cite or quote without author’s permission. Some part of the work 
contained herein was supported by an Institutional Research Grant, Carleton University, 2006. The section 
on the Global Management Revolution is a distillation of parts of a paper entitled “Exporting Policy 
Models: The Role of International Governmental Organizations,” presented at the 20th World Congress of 
the International Political Science Association. Fukuoka, Japan, July 2006. I am indebted to my son 
Matthew Pal for a re-introduction to Cormac McCarthy, and for the theme of this paper.  
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civilizations and far removed geographically probably can be dated from the British 
Empire and the export of its parliamentary and administrative systems, and was starkly 
displayed in the late 20th century Japanese attempt to modernize after the Meiji 
restoration (Westney, 1987).  
The last fifty years has seen an intensification of this global mode of public sector 
reform, in that the process is now driven not by single states, but by international or 
global organizations, most iconically the World Bank, the EU, and the OECD. This paper 
focuses on the OECD and its work on public sector reform. As we note below, the OECD 
became a prominent global advocate for the New Public Management (NPM) through its 
governance committee, PUMA (the Directorate is known as GOV). While that broadly 
remains true today, the OECD has actually projected a much more complex narrative 
about the nature of governance and public sector reform than is commonly realized. 
There are only a handful of studies on the content of this narrative. This paper will 
examine the narrative in detail, and its master theme of “modernization under stress.” The 
theme emphasizes the importance of emulation and borrowing among a family of nations 
that wish to move towards modernity together. At the same time, it has to invert that 
theme to respect particularities and avoid the impression that only one model of public 
sector reform is viable or worthy. The narrative is therefore a series of “inversions 
without end” as the OECD moves from the particular to the universal, from models to 
modalities, from reform to redemption. 
The sheer scope of the OECD’s work on public sector reform – budgeting, ethics, 
e-government, regulation, social policy – makes it necessary to focus on those documents 
that have periodically treated the general theme of reform and modernization, or what 
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broadly might be termed “governance.” These documents in effect are reflections on the 
modern state as such. The OECD only entered the governance field after a 1979 
conference in Madrid, and PUMA was only formally established in 1990.  Since then, it 
has released a handful of  documents on the general theme of governance or public sector 
modernization. The paper reviews the narratives constructed in four representative 
documents: Governance in Transition (1995), two policy briefs on modernizing 
government (2003, 2005), and the most recent review, Modernising Government: The 
Way Forward (2005). First, however, it briefly reviews the nature of the global 
management revolution that was launched in the 1990s, and the existing work on the 
OECD’s role in that revolution. It concludes with observations on the key themes in the 
documents, as well as on how we should think about the influence of the OECD and 
global knowledge networks. 
 
The Global Public Management Revolution 
NPM took the world by storm in the 1990s, but there still is debate about what the 
movement – and it had a messianic quality – was and is actually about. Barzelay (1992: 
5) argues that NPM calls for the replacement of a “bureaucratic paradigm” of carefully 
defined roles, reliance on rules and procedures, line and staff distinctions, tight financial 
control, and central agency oversight, with a more client-focused, service-oriented 
system. Bevir, Rhodes and Weller (2003) highlight the following features of NPM:  
The term refers to a focus on management, not policy, and on performance 
appraisal and efficiency; disaggregating public bureaucracies into agencies which 
deal with each other on a user pay basis; the use of quasi-markets and of 
contracting out to foster competition; cost-cutting; and a style of management 
that emphasizes, among other things, output targets, limited term contracts, 




Kenneth Kernaghan (2000) provides a useful list that contrasts what he calls 
“bureaucratic” with “post-bureaucratic” organizations. The characteristics of post-
bureaucratic organizations are citizen-centred, results-oriented, decentralized, and 
competitive structures and processes. Hood (1996) claimed that the key features were an 
emphasis on: hands-on management; performance; output measures; disaggregated 
bureaucracy into smaller, self-contained units; competition; the emulation of private 
sector practices; and discipline and parsimony in the use of resources. Kettl (2005) 
broadly agreed in describing the trends in new management thinking as productivity (how 
can governments produce more services with less tax money?); marketization (how can 
government use market-style incentives to root out the pathologies of government 
bureaucracy?); service orientation (how can government better connect with citizens?); 
decentralization (how can government make programs more responsive and effective?); 
accountability for results (how can governments improve their ability to deliver what they 
promise?); policy (how can government improve its capacity to devise and track policy?). 
To complicate matters even further, while much of the literature in the 1990s and early 
2000s focused on NPM as a shorthand for describing shifts in public management theory 
and practice, Peters (2001) argued that NPM was in fact only a species of an even 
broader variety of changes in modes of governing. He discerned four emerging models: 
market, participatory state, flexible government (e.g., experimentation, low cost, virtual 
organizations, etc.), and deregulated government (e.g., more managerial freedom, 
entrepreneurial, creative, active). Each model diagnoses the governance/management 
problem differently, has different ideas about how the public sector should be organized 
and constructed, and offers different visions of the policy process.   
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Despite these differences in interpretation and emphasis, it is clear that a new 
model of public management was being debated in the 1990s, one that emphasized 
efficiency, markets, decentralization, performance and results accountabilities, and 
service. The typically cited “leaders” in this “revolution” were New Zealand (Boston, 
1996; Boston et al., 1999; Aucoin, 1995), and the United Kingdom (Savoie, 1994). Of 
equal interest in the discussion of NPM was how it spread and how deeply it was 
affecting governments around the world. “Since the 1980s, a global reform movement in 
public management has been vigorously underway” (Kettl, 2005: 1). Peters and Pierre 
(2000) noted: "Except perhaps during major wars there never has been the extent of 
administrative reform and reorganization that has been occurring during the period from 
approximately 1975 onward” (1).  
The broad agreement that public management reform was occurring around the 
world was part of a larger debate about the causes and consequences of that reform. 
While it should have been obvious that there was a suspiciously uniform character to the 
reform movement, most analysis was purely comparative – looking at single countries 
and mapping their experiences against each other. Even in the case of central and Eastern 
Europe, where the role of international actors as drivers of political and administrative 
reform should have been clear, analysts only belatedly realized their importance. 
Schmitter, for example, admitted in 1996 that there had been far too much focus on 
internal, domestic developments and that is was now time to “to reconsider the impact of 
the international context upon regime change” (1996: 27). Risse-Kappen agreed, in 
noting that the "interaction between international norms and institutions, on the one hand, 
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and domestic politics, on the other, is not yet fully understood; work in this area has just 
begun" (1995: 31). 
 It should not be surprising therefore that there is relatively little work on the role 
of the OECD in facilitating the global management revolution. Hood (1998: 202) for 
example noted, somewhat cynically, that international organizations like the OECD and 
the World Bank had a vested interest in arguing on behalf of “best practice” models that 
they would then have a role in fostering and supporting.  Premfors argued that PUMA 
had developed the dominant narrative of public sector reform and that it had “been very 
successful in stimulating interest and debate among both member governments and wider 
audiences and in formulating and propagating a particular mode of thinking about 
administrative reform” (1998: 142). Other scholars agreed: "PUMA has been one of the 
nodal points in an international network, bringing together civil servants, management 
consultants and academics (an occasionally politicians themselves) who are interested in 
public management. It has helped shape what has now become an international 
'community of discourse' about public management reform….The World Bank, the IMF 
and the Commonwealth Institute have also been international disseminators of 
management reform ideas” (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000: 20-21).  In a broader study of 
transnational discourse communities concerned with public sector reform, Hansen, 
Krause, Salsko-Iversen and Bislev ( 2002: 113)  observe that international organizations 
and professional organizations share a “capacity to intervene from outside the specific 
politically and historically generated logics that any given governance institution, 
whether sub-national, national or supra-national is embedded in, and provide these 
institutions with notions about governance unmediated by territorial politics. Even if 
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these notions are subsequently negotiated locally, the very power to place them on the 
agenda in multiple contexts and at different levels constitutes a potentially globalizing 
force." 
The more recent interest in global knowledge networks (Stone, 2004) has of 
course trained more attention on international organizations, the OECD among them 
(Sahlin-Andersson, 1996, 2000; Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall, 2002; Pollitt, 2006).  
However, apart from general observations that the OECD was a champion of NPM, there 
has been little sustained analysis of its vision of public sector management, and public 
sector reform. 
 
The OECD and Public Management: Narratives and Inversions 
PUMA was established in 1990 as one of the OECD’s committees – at the time it 
stood for Public Management Committee. The title of the committee has now changed to 
Public Governance Committee, and has representatives of senior officials from central 
agencies from all 30 OECD’s members. PUMA actually grew out of a pre-existing 
committee, TECO, which provided financial assistance to European countries to 
modernize both their societies and economies (Sahlin-Andersson, 2000). TECO had a 
large budget, but increasingly came under pressure as the OECD faced a financial crunch 
and financial aid seemed less relevant with the establishment of the EEC and eventually 
the EU. PUMA therefore was created to provide not financial aid, but advice and analysis 
around public management challenges and issues. Originally it was to last five years, and 
so it Governance Under Pressure report was the culmination as well as distillation of its 
 7
first period of life and activity. It was given an extension and eventually became a 
permanent feature of the OECD.  
The Public Governance Committee oversees the work on public governance and 
meets twice a year. The Secretariat that conducts the work is known by the acronym 
GOV. The work consists principally, as most of the OECD’s work does, of research and 
reports, workshops and conferences, and several networks (or working parties) of 
officials clustered around specific topics. The Working Party of Senior Budget Officials 
focuses on public sector budgeting and management issues. The Working Party on 
Human Resources Management addresses public sector management issues such as 
“leadership, building professionalism, civil service ethics, training and development, 
performance management and knowledge management.” The Working Party on 
Regulatory Management and Reform works to build “good regulations in Member 
countries, emphasizing regulatory quality - combining both good regulation where 
needed to protect health, safety, and the environment and to enhance the functioning of 
markets, and deregulation where free markets work better.” The Senior Officials from 
Centres of Government group brings together heads of prime minister’s offices, cabinet 
secretaries, secretaries-general of governments and other senior officials, including ones 
from the Commission of the European Union. Finally, there is the Territorial 
Development Policy Committee, aimed as promoting regional competitiveness.  
As has often been noted, none of this machinery is coercive. The OECD is a talk 
shop, a venue, and network for exchanges of ideas and experiences supplemented by 
research. As discussed at greater length in the conclusion, this means that it wields 
influence primarily through “soft”  policy instruments – information, naming and 
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shaming, and standards setting. But there were structural factors in the 1980s and 1990s 
that gave the OECD and ultimately PUMA a receptive audience for these instruments 
(and typically, with informational tools, an audience has to have an ear cocked in the first 
place). The 1980s were particularly turbulent – the second oil shock which in turn 
destabilized budgets in the western countries; the Reagan and Thatcher and Lange (New 
Zealand) revolutions; the collapse of the Soviet Union. The rebuilding of central and 
Eastern Europe initially involved economic policy interventions around privatization and 
the creation of markets, but quickly raised concerns about transitions to democracy and 
appropriate forms of governance and administration.  
What follows is a textual analysis2 of the rhetorical devices used in four 
representative documents dealing broadly with governance and modernization. The first 
document, Government in Transition (1995) is sufficiently important that it will be 
treated separately. The other three (two short policy briefs and the most recent review of 
a decade of reform) will be dealt with collectively. Government in Transition was a 
unique document for several reasons. First, it was the culmination of five years of 
PUMA’s mandate, and was intended to be its singular product. Second, it was seminal, 
since no such broad review of public management reform or modernization had been 
attempted before. Third, it is universally recognized as having been uniquely influential, 
particularly in popularizing NPM.  
The textual analysis conducted on these documents is not meant to belittle them 
simply as rhetorical flourishes without content. There were indeed realities to which these 
reports were responding, and which they often describe and analyze faithfully. The point 
                                                 
2 For the purposes of this paper, we treat the documents as coherent wholes, as though a single author 
wrote them. Of course, complex documents of this type, especially ones emanating from organizations as 
baroque as the OECD, are a secretion of hundreds of small, cooperative efforts in research and drafting.  
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simply is that reality has to be framed and highlighted, and in so doing, some aspects are 
emphasized and some are not. Moreover, PUMA operates in a competitive environment 
both within the OECD (in terms the usual turf wars in any organization over funding, 
personnel), and internationally among other governmental and non-governmental 
organizations in the public sector reform business. To survive and thrive, it has to make 
its case persuasively. Part of that dark art is narrative, weaving the facts into a  
compelling story.  
Governance in Transition had a tone of naked urgency and radicalism that one 
rarely finds in reports by international organizations. Its key premise was that a 
combination of fiscal pressures, rising public demands, falling public trust, and increasing 
global economic competition was creating a policy environment “marked by great 
turbulence, uncertainty and an accelerating pace of change” in which tradition 
“governance structures and managerial responses are increasingly ineffectual” (p. 15). 
Half measures were out of the question; only “fundamental change” would do.  While the 
report acknowledged that countries had responded to these challenges differently, and 
that while there was no single best model of governance, nonetheless it was possible to 
identify “common reform trends.”  Principal among these trends was a focus on results 
and performance in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, and quality of service, and 
decentralization of public management. 
The environment facing governments is described bleakly, like a sermon to 
dinosaurs on the cusp of the first ice age: “Organisations that do not learn to adapt 
themselves to ever-faster, multi-fronted change atrophy until external forces transform 
them. Governments no less than business have to adapt to an environment that is 
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becoming more turbulent, complex and difficult to predict. Global transformations, 
caused by, among other things, developments in technology, communications and trade, 
demand new abilities. Flexibility and nimbleness have become key objectives. Inherited 
forms of governance appear outmoded and inflexible” (p. 21). The report coyly declined 
to use the term “crisis” to describe this new environment, but it allowed that current 
pressures were considerable, and that those to come would be “at least equally impressive 
and challenging” (p. 22).  
The bulk of the report is divided into chapters describing major reform efforts in 
the following areas: devolving authority; performance and accountability; developing 
competition and choice; service; human resources management; information technology; 
regulation; and strengthening steering functions. It acknowledged that countries differ at 
the level of individual reforms, but it strongly asserted that nonetheless there was a 
“remarkable degree of convergence overall” with “clear patterns of reform” (p. 25).  The 
report had no doubts about the radical nature of these changes. They amounted to a 
“paradigm shift.” The “fundamental, comprehensive nature of the changes described 
represents a move to a new order” (p. 27). Unsurprisingly, the report noted that change on 
this scale would inevitably generate resistance, and so devoted a chapter to implementing 
reform, highlighting the fact that public management reform is “a long haul, not a quick 
fix” (p. 80).  
 Governance in Transition was the first attempt at a broad overview of public 
management and governance issues in the OECD countries. From that point on PUMA 
concentrated on sectoral policy and administrative reforms, and would not take up the 
broad theme of governance per se until 2003, when it launched a series of Policy Briefs 
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“look at the evolving modernization agenda and how governments can best develop their 
capacity to achieve, and measure, the desired results.” In the series, two publications are 
of direct relevance, and fed into the third. They were Public Sector Modernizations 
(2003), and Public Sector Modernisation: The Way Forward (2005).3 They in turn both 
fed into the more detailed study, Modernising Government: The Way Forward.4 Since 
they were written only years apart, and since the first two clearly were drawn upon for 
the longer report, we will treat them as a group. 
It is possible to discern six rhetorical themes that appear repeatedly in the three 
documents. Each of those themes is presented and discussed below, with representative 
examples from each of the documents (each document has multiple examples of each 
theme). However, they do not stand alone and isolated from each other – their organic 
relationship, and indeed their rhetorical power, comes from being elements of a larger, 
master narrative. Each of the documents expresses or reflects that narrative slightly 
differently, like different translations of the Bible. And yet the main lines of the narrative 
shine through in all three. It is a complex narrative, since it needs to balance opposing 
ideas and agendas, not least whether there should be convergence towards some single 
model or a range of different paths up the mountain. This is an excavation from the texts: 
In the past years, all OECD countries have faced major pressures for 
reform – technological, demographic, budgetary, political. All have 
undertaken reform, though at varying rates and with varying success. 
Mistakes were made along the way, particularly with a single-minded 
                                                 
3 Both documents are available at 
www.oecd.org/findDocument/0,2350,en_2649_37405_1_119696_1_1_37405,00.html  
4 This not available free on the web. It can be purchased, or it can be accessed by subscribers at 
SourceOECD. 
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devotion to efficiency and to instrumental reform. Certainly, there were 
major surprises as the pioneers of reform forged ahead on the cold, 
unforgiving plains of their administrative and political systems. We now 
know some of the mistakes that were made, principally that there was not 
enough attention to culture and the fragility of institutions, or to the 
diverse paths towards modernity. But the pressures have not subsided, and 
reform and modernization will have to continue. All OECD countries face 
the same pressures, and they share the same basic principles – how they 
respond to those pressures and implement those principles will always be 
a matter of context. Reformers will face challenges, since change is never 
easy. They must renew their efforts, develop better tools and better 
calibration, and move forward, ever forward. 
 
Theme 1: Reform is Driven by Pressure5
The animating theme of all three documents, and indeed of the narrative, is the 
notion of “pressures” that have made reform inevitable and unavoidable. PB2003 
mentions the word pressure 11 times in eight pages; PB2005 four times; WG 43 times in 
205 pages of text. While there usually is reference to technology, the key pressures that 
identified in the text are budgetary and citizenry. The budgetary pressures are privileged 
as a historical source of public sector reforms, but clearly cannot be as prominent as they 
were a decade ago. Nonetheless, MG (p. 21) does refer to continuing budgetary pressures 
due to “demands on social transfer systems” exacerbated by the challenge of an ageing 
                                                 
5 The documents will be referred to in this section as PB2003, PB2005, and MG. 
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population. But clearly the main pressure that is cited in all three documents is a 
dissatisfied and somewhat truculent citizenry. The dissatisfaction manifests itself in 
different ways: demands for more services, demands for more efficient services, 
disgruntlement about high taxation, a vaguely defined set of inflated “expectations.” 
Though the references are brief, the OECD portrays citizens as somewhat petulant 
demandeurs, whom government officials ignore at their peril. This is not to deny the 
power of public opinion or public outrage and even demonstrations of violence: the point 
is the rhetoric and the way it sets up the tone of argument. The nature of the pressure, its 
legitimacy and its implacable strength, makes reform less a choice than a necessity. Not 
to reform risks “being out of step” or “not adapting” – in other words to rupture  the 
harmony that should exist between public institutions and citizens. 
With these new challenges, public management is becoming a major policy issue. 
It is receiving an unprecedented level of attention in OECD countries and beyond, 
and the pressures for change will not ease off in the decades ahead. (PB2003, 2) 
 
Budget worries triggered reform in many countries, but the underlying pressure 
for change came from social, economic and technological developments which 
left governments increasingly out of step with society’s expectations. (PB2005, 1)  
 
The impetus for change came from many different sources –including the social, 
economic and technological developments in the latter half of the 20th century– 
which put pressure on all governments to adapt to new problems, new capacities 
and new relationships between citizens and governments. The public were 
increasingly concerned about the quality of the services they received and the 
choices available to them. Citizens were also increasingly resistant to the 
government’s growing share of the national economy. In some countries, an 
expectation that taxation would decline became generally accepted across the 
political spectrum. …More and more, governments became out of step with a 
changing society and with an educated and empowered citizenry looking to 
amend their social contract. (MG, 19) 
 
Theme 2: Surprises and Unintended Consequences 
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This is a theme that points largely to the past, but resonates with possible follies in 
the future, and so reinforces a sense of caution about what is possible. It projects the 
notion of early “pioneers” (PB2003 refers to “first-generation pioneers” and to “pioneer 
reformers”) who were single-minded in their objectives – building sod huts of reform on 
the unforgiving prairie of management. They accomplished a great deal, but made 
mistakes – moreover, ones that in retrospect, seem surprising. It is upon their shoulders 
that modern reformers stand. This manouevre accomplishes several things. As 
mentioned, it exculpates the OECD from its youthful enthusiasm for NPM, but it also 
builds a platform for departures, and indeed a wider agenda of reform that engages not 
simply management but governance more widely. The early reformers may have cleared 
the forest, but neglected the ecology of the landscape. Ecological management is much 
more complicated and demanding. 
These reforms have indeed had a major impact but they have also given rise to 
some unexpected problems of their own. Even a seemingly straightforward action 
such as simplifying a welfare benefit form and cutting the time taken to process it 
may, for example, encourage more people to apply for the benefit, increasing the 
workload and making it more difficult to cut waiting time. While more efficient 
government is certainly desirable, efficiency alone is not a guarantee of better  
government. (PB2003, 1) 
 
The first-generation pioneers of public sector reform also faced the challenge of 
adjusting to a rapidly-changing world economy. But then the rhetoric of the day 
identified government itself as “the problem”. This led to an impression that there 
was a single generic cause – “bureaucracy”— to be addressed by a generic set of 
solutions – “reform” – to arrive at the desired result – “efficiency”. This approach 
suggested a single change from an unreformed to a reformed efficient state, a 
coherent task with a specific purpose that would be completed when this goal was 
reached. Since the primary goal was economic efficiency, the pioneer reformers 
went to work on reducing public expenditure, freeing up the public sector labour 
market and making greater use of market-type mechanisms in government.  
(PB2003, 2) 
 
Most public administrations have become more efficient, more transparent and 
customer-oriented as a result. But perhaps surprisingly, these changes have not 
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reduced governments’ influence in society –indeed, government now has a different 
but larger presence in OECD countries than 20years ago. (PB2005, 1) 
 
Despite these changes –and contrary to the expectations of some reformers– in 
most OECD countries, public expenditure did not shrink greatly. (MG, 20) 
 
Theme 3: Reform Involves Multiple Goals 
This theme is closely wedded to the previous one – the mistakes that were made, 
principally in the single-minded pursuit of efficiency, were in part due to the complexity 
of the reform process and the fact that it cannot focus on simply one goal. Multiple goals 
have to be pursued simultaneously, and consequently balanced carefully. A wider agenda 
of reform demands more sophisticated tools and analytical capacities. 
To complicate matters, governments are now under pressure for more profound 
changes to meet the requirements of contemporary society. A concern for efficiency 
is being supplanted by problems of governance, strategy, risk management, ability 
to adapt to change, collaborative action and the need to understand the impact of 
policies on society. To respond to this challenge, member countries, and the OECD, 
need better analytical and empirical tools and more sophisticated strategies for  
change than they have generally had to date. (PB2003, 1) 
 
And openness in itself does not necessarily improve governance, nor does it 
override all other public values. It should be balanced against other values of 
efficiency, equity, and responsibility. (PB2005, 3) 
 
Theme 4: The Importance of Culture/Values and the Organic Nature of Reform 
 
This theme is actually an amalgam of three related aspects of governance reform: 
the organic nature of government, the importance of taking account of organizational 
culture, and the role of values in organizations. This echoes the complexity theme cited 
earlier, that public sector reform cannot be mechanistic or purely instrumental, that it 
must take into account a very broad range of potential interaction effects as well as the 
less obvious dimensions of organizational behaviour.  
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The documents do not use the term “organic” but prefer the notion of a “whole of 
government” approach. In PB2005, this is presented as a “lesson” from two decades of 
reform efforts – that public administration and governance must be seen as part of an 
“interconnected whole.” This suggests a sort of organizational ecology where changes in 
one part of the system will ripple through and affect others. This also reflects stronger 
appreciation of the constitutional integrity of the state. Whereas the reforms in the early 
1990s tended to think in terms of “machinery of government” – that is, mechanistically, 
and in terms of a machine with parts that could be oiled, interchanged, altered, or even 
dispensed with, the new view being proposed by the OECD is that states have a 
constitutional personality that is in part founded in law, but is also an artifact of the 
integral operation of key systems or “levers” such as the budget process, the civil service 
management process, and the accountability process. These form interactive cycles, and 
so disruptions or changes in one will reverberate with the others. 
An appreciation of the organic nature of government is complemented with an 
appreciation of the importance of culture within organizations. PB2003 notes, for 
example, that “it has long been recognized that the core public service is controlled more 
by culture than by rules, a situation that is likely to continue despite progress in target-
setting, performance contracts and measurement.” Moreover, these documents express an 
appreciation for the historical roots of administrative culture in the OECD countries (e.g., 
the neutrality of the public service) as something that was achieved over decades if not 
hundreds of years. In an odd way, this is testament both to the fragility and the resilience 
of public administrative systems. They are resilient in the sense that they can resist mere 
technical interventions that do not address real cultural change. Indeed, the documents are 
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forthright in acknowledging that a great deal of the public sector reform movement in the 
last twenty years was superficial – that it served the interest of certain groups to announce 
reforms, but not to invoke the pain and resistance of actually following through with 
those changes. By the same token, reforms that focus on behaviours without addressing 
the norms and cultures that underpin those behaviours will not be successful. But this 
notion of culture also signals fragility – if these cultural norms are ignored in the 
enthusiasm of instrumental change, then what is most distinctive and important about the 
public sector and how it contributes to modern society, may be lost.  
Closely related to the idea of culture is the notion of values. The distinction is not 
clear in the documents, and the terms seem almost interchangeable, but whereas culture 
seems to be more connected to organizational norms and practices, values seem more 
closely aligned with specific democratic governance norms, such as a professional civil 
service, a dedication to the public interest, or leadership practices.  
A key consequence of highlighting culture, values and the organic nature of 
governance is that public management or “modern governance” is not a goal that will be 
immediately attainable. It requires long-term commitment, thoughtful implementation, 
and patience. Moreover, if the interaction effects of an ecological view of governance are 
taken seriously, then it is likely that reform will be a project without end, since 
reformation of one part of the system will inevitably perturb other parts, which will then 
in turn have to be adjusted and reformed, which in turn will feed back and affect the 
others, ad infinitum.  
The second problem was a failure to appreciate that, despite its size and 
complexity, government remains a single enterprise. Governments operate in a 
unified constitutional setting and coherent body of administrative law, and their 
performance is determined by the interaction of a few crucial levers such  
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as the policy process, the budget process, the civil service management process and 
the accountability process, all within the ambient political/administrative culture. 
Because of that, a reform of one of these levers inevitably involves the others. 
(PB2003, 3) 
 
The third problem was a failure to understand that public management 
arrangements not only deliver public services, but also enshrine deeper governance 
values and are therefore, in some respects, inseparable from the constitutional 
arrangements in which they are imbedded. (PB2003, 3) 
 
We also need to acquire a better understanding of the time required for serious 
public management interventions: culture change is not achieved overnight, and 
may take several years. (PB2003, 3) 
 
Systemic reform in the public sector requires clarity about the behaviour, attitudes 
and beliefs that are to be changed, an appreciation of how formidable the challenge 
of cultural change really is… (PB2003, 5) 
 
Traditional thinking on public sector reform has often seen policy, people, money, 
and organisations as if they were independent components of public management. 
This study has made it clear that they are closely interlinked. It is important for 
reform strategies to take account of the interlinked nature of these components of 
government. (MG, 201) 
  
 
Theme 5: Context Matters/Differences Among Countries 
As we noted above, the OECD is widely regarded to have been a key international 
champion of NPM in the late 1990s, more so than the World Bank for example. 
Governance in Transition was a highpoint in that proselytizing for several reasons. NPM 
was less than a decade old, and was still a dominant force in the academic literature – the 
doubts and critiques would come later. The challenge of helping the “transition” states in 
central and Eastern Europe rested on the assumption that they would be brought up to 
“western” (i.e., a single set) of standards in economic structures, policy initiatives, and 
administrative practices, and it must be said that recipient countries were quite prepared 
to adopt foreign “models” in order to have access to donor funds.  
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A decade later the OECD was taking a more subtle approach, and indeed 
highlighting the divergent paths countries might take on the arduous journey of reform, as 
well as the importance of context for the reform process. Interestingly, the importance of 
context is only a minor theme in PB2003, but by 2005 is a major theme of both PB2005 
and MG.  This is listed as the second key lesson of two decades of reform, that 
modernization efforts must pay attention to the specific characteristics of each country, 
and be tailored to circumstances. Similar reform efforts in different contexts will yield 
different results. In the MG report, context becomes the major finding of the document: 
“The main lesson the emerges from this review is that modernization is context 
dependent…” (MG, 201).  It is in this vein the that report is surprisingly critical of the 
“best practice” movement, because it usually involves the transfer of some universal 
remedy to contexts that may not be suited to them.  
Naturally, if this conclusion were taken to its extreme, there would be little point 
in cross-country comparisons, or indeed, for the GOV directorate in the OECD. The MG 
report explicitly recognizes this, and suggests several ways around the conundrum. First, 
reforms that appear useful should be set against similar systems to see how they might be 
implemented in similar contexts. Borrowing and policy transfer therefore would occur 
among families of countries rather than as a movement to change them al towards a 
single standard simultaneously. Second, it should be recognized that convergence will 
occur at different rhythms among different countries and for different types of reforms. 
The report notes for example that strong convergence has occurred among the OECD 
countries in terms of budgeting practices (interestingly, in part because of an international 
context where governments pay higher borrowing costs if their fiscal position is 
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considered unsound), but not around accountability and control systems. Third, the only 
way to assess the potential impact of a given reform is to have a clear sense of the 
governmental and administrative context into which that reform will be introduced – this 
requires that governments (perhaps with the OECD’s help) should conduct further 
research on their own internal systems, a diagnostique that will prevent the introduction 
of reform antibodies that might be rejected by the body politic. Finally, more research has 
to be conducted at the global level in order to understand the micro-dynamics of reform, 
and measures need to be developed in order to grasp the real impacts on governance 
systems of any given reform initiative. Clearly, this is a burden for the OECD (it 
launched a “Management in Government: Comparative Country Data” in November 
2005).  
Modernisation is context dependent: OECD countries’ reform experiences 
demonstrate that the same reform instruments perform differently and produce very 
diverse results in different country contexts. This variation in reform experiences 
reflects the disparate institutional structures and environments that confront the 
reformers. A strong lesson to emerge from this review is that modernisation is 
context dependent. Modernisation strategies need to be tailored to an individual 
country’s context, needs and circumstances. (MG, 22) 
 
The main lesson that emerges from this review is that modernisation is context 
dependent: the nature of the problem and the solution are strongly influenced by 
the national country context. The design of reform strategies must be calibrated to 
the specific risks and dynamics of the national public administration system and 
take a whole-of-government approach. (MG, 201) 
 
One of the main lessons from the reform experience is that there is no single 
generic solution to the problems of public administration. Countries come from 
different starting points, with different cultures, and face different problems, so the 
solutions must also be tailor-made to fit their circumstances. (PB2005, 6) 
 
 
Theme 6: Change is Difficult/Challenging 
This theme is less a single element in the reports than a thread that runs through 
the entire cloth. The themes of complexity and the organic nature of governance signal 
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that public management reform is challenging at best, and verges on dangerous at worst. 
The repeated references to past mistakes also highlight the risks associated with reform 
(these comments are usually balanced with acknowledgements that much was 
nonetheless accomplished, but the message is clear that despite accomplishments, major 
mistakes were made). Even the strong emphasis in MG on context is a backhanded 
reference to the need for care and prudence in proposing best practices. As part of a 
narrative, of course, this goes well beyond the simple acknowledgement t hat change is 
difficult. It helps signal several messages. First, and somewhat paradoxically, the 
emphasis on danger and challenge reinforces the sense that reform efforts are necessary, 
like a pep talk to a SWAT team before it launches a mission. Second, it steels the will. 
The subtext is that resistance to change is understandable, but irrational. Reformers have 
to be prepared to encounter irrational resistance, and simply ride it through. Third, it 
subtly delegitimizes resistance to change, precisely by emphasizing it as a universal 
reaction. Again, considering it a universal reaction makes it a thoughtless reflex; it should 
be dealt with the same way a doctor deals with a patient’s flinching before the needle. 
Finally, if resistance to change is universal, it is unlikely to be easily overcome, and so 
reform efforts will naturally stretch over time, and perhaps a very long time, before they 
are successful. Interestingly, the documents make little reference to building 
constituencies of support or collaboration – though this does not mean that these more 
cooperative strategies of change are being ruled out. Instead, governance reform seems a 
lonely vocation, doomed to opposition, fraught with uncertainty, and potentially 
disastrous if done incorrectly.  
Major change is uncomfortable and anxiety-producing, and because of this there is 
a natural instinct to resist it. Dedicated managerial attention can change officials’ 
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behaviour but it is only at the point where this behaviour has been internalised by 
individuals and groups – the point of cultural change – that it is likely to continue 
without such attention. So a reform that does not reach the critical point of 
internalisation will slip back to the prior state once the dedicated effort for change 
relaxes. And that is what happens to many attempted reforms. (PB2003, 6) 
 
…politicians face hard and unpopular choices in some countries if long-term 
difficulties are to be avoided. (PB2005, 2) 
 
Reforms cannot substitute for hard political choices: For OECD countries, 
improving the cost-effectiveness and performance of their public sectors will help 
to reduce pressure on spending. As the past decade has shown, however, this in 
itself is unlikely to stem the continued upward pressure on expenditure generated 
by social entitlement programmes and social transfers. Public sector reform is not 
a substitute for the hard and, in many cases, unpopular choices that politicians 
have to make in some countries if long-term difficulties are to be avoided. (MG, 21) 
 
Citizens’ expectations and demands of governments are growing, not diminishing: 
they expect openness, higher levels of service quality delivery, solutions to more 
complex problems, and the maintenance of existing social entitlements. Reforms to 
the public sector in the past 20 years have significantly improved efficiency, but 
governments of OECD countries now face a major challenge in finding new 
efficiency gains that will enable them to fund these growing demands on 21st 
century government. For the next 20 years, policy makers face hard political 
choices. Since most governments cannot increase their share of the economy, in 
some countries this will put pressure on entitlement programmes. These new 
demands on builders of public management systems will require leadership from 
officials with enhanced individual technical, managerial and political capacities 





Conclusions: The OECD and Global Governance 
We divide out conclusions into two categories, those about the OECD and 
management reform and those on the contemporary nature of globalization and global 
governance. 
The OECD has been actively involved in public sector management reform for 
almost twenty years, since PUMA was created in 1990.  It is important to remind 
ourselves that the OECD has no authoritative capacity as such, and cannot order its 
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members to do anything (though more on this below). Accordingly, it has had to leverage 
its position in this field as an information broker, moreover a broker with distinct 
characteristics. First, it is an intergovernmental organization; its members are states. 
While membership currently sits at 30, the OECD has expanded its activities to embrace 
non-members as well. In the field of governance, for example, its is mounting a good 
governance initiative with Arab states; is involved with APEC in regulatory reform; has a 
South Eastern Europe Regional Program; and also has programs with Russia and China. 
So, despite its small formal membership, it is in fact global in scope and influence. 
Second, the OECD operates with a special mix of research and country participation. 
Governments broadly set its research agenda, and governments/members are usually 
involved in reviewing reports before they are published. But the OECD’s comparative 
advantage is that it can draw on the willing support of its members (and other states) to 
provide “inside” information about what governments are doing in specific fields, and 
that information by definition is credible. The key instruments that the OECD uses to 
exercise influence are research based, informational ones: (1) ordinary seminars and 
workshops involving academic experts, government officials, or both; (2) “high-level” 
seminars of government officials and/or experts; (3) peer-to-peer visits by government 
delegations to study “best practices” in other governments; (4) didactic country reports 
that openly recommend certain changes in order to meet global stands (e.g., a 2005 report 
on China arguing for major reforms in public and corporate governance; (5) journals, 
newsletters, policy briefs (e.g., the OECD Journal on Budgeting); (6) the development 
and facilitation of networks of officials to exchange information (e.g., the network of 
Senior Budget Officials); (7) the development and issuance of “guidelines” in certain 
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areas that governments can voluntarily adopt (e.g., the Guidelines for Managing Conflict 
of Interest in the Public Service); (8) the construction of inventories, checklists, and 
frameworks that can guide decision-makers in specific fields (e.g., Public Sector 
Integrity: A Framework for Assessment); (9) surveys of governments and their practices; 
(10) databases and indicators. This is a formidable informational arsenal that would have 
to be invented if it did not already exist. However, it could probably not be invented 
outside of an organization like the OECD that combines a clubby atmosphere of 
governments with the more cerebral qualities of a think tank.  
The OECD has used all of these instruments in the governance and public 
management field to exercise influence over “public sector modernization.” Indeed, as 
we noted earlier, its 1995 Governance in Transition report was widely discussed around 
the world because it purported to be the first survey and overview of its kind describing 
what governments were doing in reforming public management, and because it 
unabashedly supported the prescriptions of NPM. There are different varieties of NPM, 
of course, and the OECD became an early intergovernmental champion of the “more 
market/less government” version (Sahlin-Andersson, 2000). Many still characterize the 
OECD’s vision in these terms, but as we saw earlier, the organization’s views on public 
sector reform have matured and become considerably more nuanced. Whereas the 1995 
report made ritualistic references to contextual factors and the reality of different reform 
trajectories, the 2005 report elevated context to a prime theme and indeed a key 
conclusion. Whereas in 1995 the OECD did seem to be pushing universalistic solutions, 
by 2005 it was much more cautious, both about context as well as about organizational 
culture and the ecology of government institutions. From time to time, the OECD will 
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highlight the principles that bind its members and which allegedly form a common 
foundation of values about good governance (e.g., transparency, accountability), and it 
will occasionally chide governments for not meeting global standards, but its considered 
views on modernizing governance are no longer confined to a narrow interpretation of 
NPM. 
Doubtless some of this is due to learning. As its own report points out, 
governments have not shrunk in the last two decades, and so a naïve NPMism would 
make little sense. As well, experience with the central and Eastern European transition 
states in the 1990s, with the EU accession process, and with the consequences of failed 
states around the world, shows that governance is hugely important for economic 
performance and social stability, let alone key services such as clean water and education.  
But I would argue that we need to talk organizational context into consideration as well – 
the GOV secretariat of the OECD is operating in governance “market” and needs to 
maintain and expand its position in that market in order to survive and thrive as an 
organization. The themes we saw in the reports, as well as the master narrative that binds 
those themes together, serve the OECD well from a marketing point of view. First, the 
emphasis on the difficulty and the challenge of public sector modernization essentially 
underscores the point that this is not for the uninformed or the faint-hearted. The repeated 
calls for more research and data and indicators reinforce the point. Second, the emphasis 
on context and variety, on the differences among governments and hence the different 
paths to reform, establishes a much wider agenda for the OECD over time than would a 
one-size-fits-all approach. The mid-1990s emphasis on a single value – efficiency – made 
for a relatively narrow range of recommendations. The new emphasis on ecology, 
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nuance, contradiction, and feedback loops creates “inversions without end,” a potential 
reform agenda that stretches far into the future. The minute calibrations required to get 
reform right will almost never end, as one set of interventions or reforms calls forth the 
need for ever new ones to deal with the ramifications of those past.  
We close now with some observations on the contemporary nature of 
globalization and global governance. A first, key point, is that the OECD’s efforts in 
proselytizing public management reform is part of a global explosion in the past twenty 
years in knowledge networks around management and management reform, in both the 
private (Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall, 2002; Kipping and Engwall, 2002) and public 
sectors (Kettl, 2005).  These knowledge networks form dense matrixes of actors and 
organizations that effectively become the discordant lattices of global coordination and 
emergent forms of global governance (Stone, 2004; Slaughter, 2004). While the phrase 
“governance without government” was coined some time ago (Rosenau and Czempiel, 
1992), it increasingly is being drawn upon to describe a world where rules of every type, 
at every level, seem to be multiplying into thick meshes of control. However, more and 
more of these rules seem to be “soft law” – standards, norms, guidelines, and 
frameworks. States are clearly involved, but are not necessarily prime movers or 
dominant players in respective networks: “Governance in a world where boundaries are 
largely in flux is being shaped and pursued in constellations of public and private actors 
that include states, international organizations, professional associations, expert groups, 
civil society groups and business corporations. Governance includes regulation but goes 
well beyond. Governance is also about dense organizing, discursive and monitoring 
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activities that embed, frame, stabilize and reproduce rules and regulations” (Djelic and 
Sahlin-Adersson, 2006: 7). 
The paradox is that that this form of dynamic and loose coupling of actors and 
organizations in the making of soft rules and non-coercive monitoring and compliance 
strategies is diffuse, messy, with a variable geometry – and yet it creates order. That order 
is fragile, unlike hierarchies of command and control backed up by force and sanctions, 
and so has to be constantly re-created and re-calibrated. The OECD is an important 
contributor to global governance that occurs without a global government. As an arena 
and a convener, it ceaselessly connects and re-connects government officials around the 
world, along with experts, NGOs, and business. Obviously, these actors do not always 
agree with each other, but the simply fact of meeting creates discursive spaces and a 
common language of concepts. More than that, however, the OECD is engaged in 
standards setting, a key instrument in soft law (Brunsson and Jacobssen, 2000). Despite 
the caution that we saw in Modernising Governance, the GOV secretariat is not at all shy 
of articulating “best practices,” frameworks, guidelines, and “success” stories. The master 
narrative of reform both tells a story but also lays out a conceptual universe, complete 
with broad objectives and strategies. This is complemented by league tables, indicators, 
and roadmaps that encourage self-reflexivity and mutual adjustment. Over time, systems 
begin to look similar, and the managers of those systems learn from each other, speak a 
similar language, and ultimately begin to coordinate in policy terms, without a central 
coordinator.  
A good example of the above is the OECD’s Anti-Corruption Network for 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Its website states:  
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The Anti-Corruption Network was established in 1998. The main objective of the 
ACN is to support its member countries in their fight against corruption by 
providing a regional forum for the promotion of anti-corruption activities, 
exchange of information, elaboration of best practices and donor coordination. 
The ACN includes countries from Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia. 
The OECD member states are also taking part in the ACN activities. The main 
counterparts of the ACN are the national governments and anti-corruption 
authorities of the participating countries. Civil society, business associations, 
international organisations and international financial institutions (IFIs) are also 
taking an active part in the ACN.6  
 
Countries submit reports that are then discussed by representatives of the ACN, 
which issues a set of recommendations. Countries respond to those recommendations 
(and are directly involved in shaping them), and then are expected to implement them. 
Monitoring reports are periodically issued, indicating the progress of implementation. 
Gradually, global standards on corruption and bribery leech out from the OECD member 
states and begin to morph into the legal systems of target states. This yields a loosely 
coupled or coordinated system of equivalent standards, that then becomes a regulatory 
regime dealing with such things as money laundering, government procurement rules, 
commissions to combat corruption, the training of judges and police officers, and so on.  
There is a misconception in some of the literature on the OECD and transnational 
governance networks that standards work primarily through soft law and voluntary 
compliance. While a good deal of the OECD’s practices do rely on these techniques, it 
also has the occasional opportunity to have a more robust effect on governance systems, 
                                                 
6 www.oecd.org/document/14/0,2340,en_36595778_36595872_36959886_1_1_1_1,00.html  The target 
countries are: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, 
Montenegro, Romania, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Bulgaria, 
Estonia and Slovenia. n addition to national governments, the ACN involves civil society, business, 
international organizations: the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD), Transparency International (TI), Open Society Institute (OSI), United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Council of Europe (CoE), Group 
of States Against Corruption (GRECO), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD 
(BIAC), American Bar Association (ABA) and others. The author was engaged in 2004 in a country review 
of Ukraine.  
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not directly but through the acceptance and application of these standards by third parties.  
For example, the OECD released the Best Practices for Budget Transparency in 2001, 
which was then incorporated by the IMF in its Manual on Fiscal Transparency (2001).7 
Together with the UN’s statistical benchmarks in COFOG (Classifications of the 
Functions of Government) these become standards of compliance in governmental fiscal 
reports to the Fund. The standards in turn inform the reporting requirements of donor 
agencies around the world, as well as private lenders to governments. In a nominal sense 
these are still “soft” law and voluntary standards, since no government can be compelled 
to use them. But to the extent the governments seek donor funds, or accession to the EU, 
for example, they will have to comply with this set of OECD standards, and the larger 
family of standards of which they are a part.  
Nonetheless, this still begs the question of why governments and their officials 
engage as energetically as they do with a body like the OECD, one that can exercise 
almost no leverage over them. This is a large topic that will have to be developed in 
future research, but at this stage we can discern at least four factors that create a receptive 
audience for OECD governance standards. First, we underestimate the pressure of 
“policy search” among modern governments.  In most cases when government officials 
are asked to develop new policies, their first question is “what are other governments 
doing?” This is both to provide a backdrop for domestic policy, but also to search for new 
ideas, techniques, tools, best practices, stories of success and failure. Most officials 
would be considered irresponsible if they did not have some grasp on what other 
                                                 
7 www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans/manual/index.htm  
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governments are doing with respect to a given policy field.8 The OECD provides a one-
stop shop for comparative policy data.  
Second, participation in the OECD yields several practical as well as symbolic 
benefits for most states. In the complex world of international relations, the practical 
benefits extend from compliance with standards that are recognized by third parties, to 
the personal connections with counterpart officials in other countries. The symbolic 
benefits arise from membership (or participation) in an exclusive and prestigious club. 
For example, even if the OECD’s CAN achieved absolutely nothing at all in practical 
terms, countries like Kazakhstan and Ukraine achieve a measure of global respectability 
simply by showing up.  
Finally, the OECD has managed to capitalize on a complex global psychology of 
“modernization,” a restless hunt to reach an always-receding horizon of improvement. 
What works now is never good enough. As Governance in Transition put it: “Unchanged 
governance structures and classic responses of “more of the same” are inappropriate to 
this intricate policy environment. …Governments must strive to do things better, with 
fewer resources, and, above all, differently.”  To be modern is to be à la mode. While the 
OECD is not as ruthless in defining la mode as New York or Parisian fashionistas, it has 
appropriated the discourse of modernity, and has a credible claim to defining what is à la 
mode through its membership and associational ties. Most governments, whatever their 
real inclinations, resist being labeled “conventional,” “backward” or “traditional.” Most 
prefer to be “modern” or to be “modernizing.” But to be modern is also to be “of the 
moment,” and as the moment is always changing, so the quest is never-ending. 
                                                 
8 This observation springs from personal experience. The author has served as a consultant on several 
federal government policy review projects, and each one without fail has demanded some sort of 
comparative analysis of other countries’ policies.  
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